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Abstract—Despite many Internet of Things (IoT) Infrastruc-
tures having been implemented in recent years, none of them is
truly prepared for a global deployment, where failure tolerance
and scalability are an essential requirement. This article presents
an alternative concept for IoT Infrastructures, which focuses
on enhancing the traditional centralized architecture, usually
operated by a single entity, into a decentralized architecture
featuring multiple business roles. We propose a dynamic and
self-configurable infrastructure on top of a structured Peer-to-
Peer network. In addition, a set of communication protocols are
provided in order to support heterogeneous devices, as well as
data access, streaming and persistence. It is also an important
focus of our proposal to have mechanisms that guarantee the
privacy and security of the information flow and storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT infrastructures must be flexible and extensible enough
to accommodate a high level of diversity, as well as to support
billions of devices producing massive amounts of data. Ideally,
one could argue that infrastructures should not exist, as they
contribute to the existing problem of data and management si-
los. The Internet grew from an organic attachment of networks
and servers, and this proved to be a much successful approach,
as a result of the amount of distribution it presents, as well as
the adaptation to new use cases and services.
Our work aims at taking a side step from current trends, in
order to avoid the many issues created by a platform oriented
to the Internet growth. In particular, we consider an Internet
where an high number of loosely coupled devices, owned
by users or even Telecom operators, provide a decentralized
infrastructure, which is responsible for interconnecting all IoT
platforms, without the need for any central entity. It focuses
on storing and securing data at a global scale, instead of in a
set of central entities. Accordingly, in a distributed approach,
entities at the edge of the network exchange information and
collaborate with each other in a dynamic way, providing a
decentralized, self-organized and scalable infrastructure.
We specifically aim at avoiding centralized data storage and
processing. Moreover, we consider that data should be strongly
encrypted and only accessible to their rightful owners, or some-
one else with the appropriate authorization. Scalability and
organic growth, by the addition of new sensors and systems,
are also mandatory. This will have the potential of empowering
local businesses and citizens to provide the services required
for others to integrate their devices. In the end, we envision
that everything will be connected to a global net, acting as a
secure common data repository and communication channel,
which we see as the real Internet of Things.
II. RELATED WORK
Large players like IBM and Samsung Eletronics devel-
oped the Autonomous Decentralized Peer-to-Peer Telemetry
(ADEPT) proof-of-concept (PoC)[1]. It aims to demonstrate
several capabilities, which are fundamental for building a full
decentralized IoT, and clearly demonstrate that these solutions
need research, having interest from the market. This PoC
selected three open source protocols for its implementation.
Combining the blockchain [1] with the IoT offers a set of
capabilities, such as immutable history of transactions, as well
as data security and privacy. ADEPT supports different types
of devices, according to their performance and storage capa-
bilities. However, it requires considerable resources for taking
advantage of the blockchain benefits, which are far away from
the common user, as they represent a considerable investment.
Moreover, no blockchain solution was tested at a world scale
[2]. Thus, this solution, paves the way to decentralized IoT
systems, but it is not ready for the current view of the IoT,
where the devices are expected to be inexpensive and their
real-time communications may be crucial.
III. PROPOSED INFRASTRUCTURE
The proposed infrastructure relies on a P2P overlay net-
work, where IoT gateways are the network peers. This network
is complemented by several WSN, which will provide data
to the infrastructure. In addition, a undefined number of
applications may communicate with it. With the proposed
topology, it is possible to achieve the Internet level of scal-
ability, once each new node joining the network shares its
resources towards the overlay. Therefore, the topology consists
of a community driven, decentralized network. Moreover, the
system may provide different roles in the overlay, which will
result in the share of computational power, storage capacity
and network bandwidth, allowing the system to scale easily. In
this section, the infrastructure requirements are identified and
the design principles are outlined along with a brief motivation
for making the associated decisions.
As the IoT continues expanding, researchers and companies
search for economical and efficient solutions to secure the
infrastructures. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been the
backbone of security in the Internet since its inception, relying
in the use of digital certificates. Above all, PKI is an econom-
ical, reliable and proven technology that can be used in order
to set up a secure and high-performance infrastructure [3].
Unlike conventional PKI and connected devices, the IoT will
be composed by constrained devices, which can compromise
the infrastructure performance.
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For a secure infrastructure, it is required to guarantee
the peers identity and authenticity. Currently, the two most
frequently adopted approaches are considerable different. One
approach consists of the existence of a Certification Authority
(CA), which acts as a trusted third party, in order to issue
digital certificates, for certifying an entity public key. The
other one resides in the use of a blockchain, which provides
a distributed entity certification. After analyzing the ADEPT
approach before, it is possible to understand that the current
blockchain cannot be used to achieve the requirements of
the proposed infrastructure. Above all, the real-time data
and scalability required will not be guaranteed using it. For
instance, a bitcoin transaction takes about 10 minutes to be
validated [2]. For this reason, this infrastructure makes use of
a centralized CA, instead of a blockchain.
A Distributed Hash Table (DHT) is an excellent choice for
an IoT infrastructure, since it provides a guarantee (precise
or probabilistic) on query cost, which makes possible that a
request can be routed to a peer, who maintains the desired
data quickly and accurately. Kademlia was the chosen DHT
implementation, since it guarantees good performance, while
also providing caching, resource replication and asynchronous
range queries [4]. Taking into consideration that the overlay
peers are required to communicate in a secure way, it is
necessary to expand this DHT implementation to a trusted and
secure overlay network. Considering the PKI, each peer of the
overlay will keep an asymmetric key pair.
While the number of networked devices is becoming larger,
their capabilities will diversify. Consequently, this infrastruc-
ture must be flexible enough to allow peers with different
purposes in the overlay, according to their hardware con-
straints. Therefore, the infrastructure should accept peers with
a set of different services enabled, namely Data Access, Data
Collector, Persistence and Stream.
The infrastructure is required to guarantee data anonymity,
in order to ensure that an attacker cannot link data to its owner.
Thus, it must manage its users, as well as their information,
in a secure way, without compromising the users privacy.
Consequently, each entity should have a pseudonym, which
is an anonym identifier of an entity, since the generated data
should not be publicly associated with a certain entity [5]. The
entity’s pseudonym must be generated on the client side, using
for example a specific hardware token, in order to assure that
only the entity can produce its own identity.
Therefore, when an application intends to sign up a new
user in the infrastructure, it must create two RSA key pairs
on the client side, one for digital signatures and another one
for encryption and decryption. Moreover, the user’s password
must be derived using a key derivation algorithm. Afterwards,
the resulting derivation is used to cipher the private keys
previously generated. In addition, the pseudonym is created
using one of the generated private keys. Finally, the application
provides the pseudonym, public keys and ciphered private keys
to the infrastructure. As a result, the infrastructure propagates
the users data trough the overlay. From that moment on,
when a user intends to log in the application, it provides
its pseudonym to the infrastructure and receives its data in
response. Afterwards, it generates the password derivation to
decrypt the private data (on client side).When a new sensor
is connected to the infrastructure, the user must bind it to its
account. Therefore, the infrastructure keeps a list of sensors
each user may access, as well as an access list of users who
may access each sensor.
The tremendous number and diverse nature of IoT de-
ployments brings new considerations to the table, concerning
how to actually implement interoperable infrastructures. The
collector interface consists of a public interface, through which
the sensors of a WSN will send their gathered data. Con-
sequently, the store interface must accept different protocol
communications, in order to be prepared to the heterogeneous
environment of sensors. Therefore, the proposed infrastructure
must accept data from protocols such as HTTP and MQTT.
Data gathered by sensors may be an attack target, which
may compromise the privacy of business processes. As a
result, the infrastructure must ensure the data storage security.
When an IoT gateway receives data from a sensor (message
contains its sensor identifier), it encrypts it through a randomly
generated symmetric key. Afterwards, the generated key is
encrypted using the public keys of the entities who have access
to the received data, in order to generate an access code for
each entity decrypt its data. Finally, having the encrypted data,
as well as the sensor assertion, it is necessary to spread this
data through the network.
The IoT global scale deploy promises to change the way
we live. To achieve this, the data generated by sensors has
to be retrieved by its owners. Consequently, the infrastructure
must assure access control, through the analysis of the sensor’s
access list. The data access may be divided into two different
interfaces, one for retrieving the last data of a sensor (stored
in the DHT) and one for retrieving the data history of a sensor
(Persistence). Moreover, it is crucial to guarantee request
authenticity and data integrity through digital signatures.
Considering the IoT premise where millions of devices
will be connected and producing massive volumes of data, the
capacity and efficiency of data storage are imperative for an
IoT infrastructure. Therefore, this data should be stored in a
distributed database, which provides data consistency, as well
as efficient data access and replication. In this context, time
series databases are optimized for sequential writes, which will
be indexed by timestamps [6]. Moreover, they also provide
efficient retrieval for data in a time interval, as well as a
fast removal of data that is no longer relevant. Consequently,
a distributed time series database is an excellent choice for
persisting the infrastructure data.
Some critical IoT scenarios demand real-time data. Con-
sequently, a global IoT infrastructure is required to provide a
stream of data, from sensors to applications, using protocols
such as MQTT. This decentralized infrastructure behaves as a
decentralized broker, where a peer whose data stream service
is enabled may receive subscribe messages from applications,
publish messages from sensors and must distribute published
data to its subscribers. Thus, all stream peers must be sub-
scribed among them, in order to allow sensors and applications
to communicate with a single peer. For security purposes, sub-
scribe messages must proceed to an access control mechanism.
Moreover, when a publish message is received, its data must
be encrypted before being distributed through its subscribers.
Finally, an example of a data flow, from a sensor to an
application is illustrated in Figure 1. Periodically, each sensor
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of a WSN sends its data to a Gateway (message 1). When
the gateway receives data, it encrypts the data, as specified
previously and propagates it through the overlay (message
2). A user (properly authenticated) asks for the sensor’s data,
through an application (message 3). The application decrypts
the received data and displays it. Moreover, the application
may subscribe a set of sensors, and receive a data stream of
their periodic data.
Fig. 1: Infrastructure Data Flow.
IV. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
The proposed infrastructure was implemented to verify its
behavior according to the defined requirements. Accordingly,
gateways were developed using Python Twisted, an event-
driven networking engine. As a result of its asynchronous na-
ture, it can handle thousands of connections in a single thread,
providing great performance and scalability. In addition, the
gateways, whose Persistence Service is enabled, have InfluxDB
enabled, a distributed time-series database.
Complementing the overlay peers, a CA was developed
using Python’s AsyncIO, as well as a web application com-
posed by a Node.js server and an AngularJS application.
Finally, two simulators were developed for sending periodic
data to the infrastructure simulating a set of sensors. Both were
developed using Python Twisted, but one communicates with
the infrastructure using MQTT protocol, while the other one
uses HTTP.
The implemented prototype is composed by seven peers.
Four of them are RaspberryPi’s, which have hardware limi-
tations and consequently, do not have persistence and stream
services enabled. The remaining ones are virtual machines with
capabilities to have all the services enabled.
Considering a 7 days test scenario in a local network, the
infrastructure received messages from the simulators, where
each sensor had its own periodicity varying between 20 and
150 seconds. The MQTT simulator contains 66 sensors, while
the HTTP has 77 sensors. On the one hand, the HTTP
simulator sent a total of 998889 messages, with an average
response time of 116.2ms. On the other side, the MQTT
simulator provided 908445 data messages, with an average
response time of 0.58ms. Thanks to its connection-oriented
nature, MQTT provided excellent and uniform results, with a
standard deviation of about 0.7. In contrast, HTTP presented
more disperse response times, with a standard deviation of
approximately 101.1. It is expected that in the Internet scale,
the response times will increase. However, the response times
will be uniform over time, as a result of the use of a time-series
database.
During the test, peers’ CPU usage was collected each 60
seconds. Taking into account the obtained results, the Stream
Service, as well as the Persistence Service are considerable
heavy, as result of the need to have a local message broker
and a local database running. It is important to notice that
InfluxDB recommends a minimum of 2-4 CPUs and it was
used only one.
In the context of the security and privacy requirements, the
data security during its flow and storage has to be validated.
Therefore, it is possible to verify the database content using
the InfluxDB shell. Moreover, as the decryption is processed
on the client side, the content of the packets that flow through
the network is also encrypted. Each chunk of data contains
a code, which consists of the symmetric key necessary to
decrypt the data. This symmetric key has to be decrypted
using the user’s private key before being used.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A global decentralized infrastructure has potential to reduce
the platform and maintenance costs. Moreover, decentralization
provides fault tolerance by removing single points of failure,
as well as scalability, thanks to the community driven nature
of P2P. In addition, the proposed infrastructure may provide
privacy to the users, as a result of their data being encrypted
and dispersed over the network. Finally, it provides all the
necessary resources to interconnect multiple business processes
and use cases, each one with its own requirements.
The proposed infrastructure matches the stated require-
ments and is a good solution for a global IoT infrastructure.
This results from the current state of the IoT, where devices
are intended to be inexpensive and lightweight, as well as the
current state of blockchain, which does not scale to the Internet
level.
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